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Abstract
Although Schumpeterian growth models typically predict that stronger patent
protection enhances innovation-driven economic growth, the empirical evidence does
not support this idea. We explore the unclear relationship at work by shedding light
on the financing of R&D investment. Empirically, R&D-intensive firms preferentially
rely on their internal cash flows rather than external funds. We develop a simple
monetary Schumpeterian growth model in which R&D firms face an endogenous
financing choice that is consistent with this evidence. In our model, the scale of
R&D investment may be financially constrained by internal cash because external
financing is costly. Our model shows that the relationship between patent protection
and growth can be either N-shaped, inverted-U shaped, or positive depending on
the inflation rate. Specifically, we find that the growth effect of the pro-patent policy
is likely to be negative under a high inflation rate, while the growth effect is always
positive under the Friedman rule.
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1 Introduction
Endogenousgrowth theoryhas traditionallypredicted thatpro-patentpolicy (i.e., strength-
ening patent protection) increases the reward from innovation and enhances economic
growth (which is called the Schumpeterian effect). However, the empirical literature does
not support this prediction. This contradiction is called the “patent puzzle” in the liter-
ature, and many researchers, whose work is listed below, have attempted to explain the
mechanism at work.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the patent puzzle by shedding light on
the financing of R&D investment. The existing literature on finance and growth has
emphasized that financial accessibility is crucial to R&D-based growth (e.g., King and
Levine, 1993). Generally, R&D-intensive firms can finance investment with internal cash
flows (i.e., operating profit) and external funds (e.g., new equity issuance or debt). This
paper attempts to connect the patent puzzle to R&D firms’ financing problem.
How do actual firms finance their R&D investment? Empirical studies show that
R&D-intensive firms preferentially rely on their internal cash flows rather than external
funds. Hall and Lerner (2010), in a comprehensive survey, conclude that firms appear to
prefer internal funds for financing R&D investments, and they manage their cash flow to
ensure this. This corporate financing behavior is consistent with the pecking order theory
ofMyers andMajluf (1984). Namely, firms prefer to use internal financing first, then debt,
while issuing new equity is the last resort.
Why do innovating firms tend to finance R&D investments with their internal cash
flows? One reason is that external financing is more costly than internal financing.1 For
example, debt financing simply entails borrowing costs (i.e., the interest rate on a loan).
Furthermore, equity financing entails costs in the sense that the stock price drops at the
announcement of a new equity issue.2 These factors make it difficult for firms to finance
R&D with external funds.
If firms finance their R&D projects with internal cash flows, some firms may face an
“internal financial constraint.” That is, the current cash flow constrains the scale of their
R&D investment, and fluctuations in their internal cash can affect R&D. Empirically, this
hypothesis seems to be correct becausemany studies not only report a positive relationship
between R&D expenditure and internal cash flows (e.g., Hall, 1992; Himmelberg and
Petersen, 1994; Sasidharan et al., 2015) but also show that R&D expenditure is sensitive
to cash flow fluctuations (e.g., Brown and Petersen, 2009; Weng and Söderbom, 2018).
1As another reason, R&D-intensive firms may face financial frictions because R&D-intensive firms tend
to have few collateralizable assets. R&D expenditures largely go to wages for researchers, and obviously,
their human capital cannot be collateralized. In addition, banks may not have the necessary skills to evaluate
R&D projects subject to significant uncertainty.
2See Eckbo et al. (2007).
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Figure 1: Scatter plots of the inflation rate (x-axis) and lending interest rate (y-axis) in
139 countries. We use the World Bank Database for both datasets. The inflation rate is
measured by the inflation rate (consumer prices). The lending rate is the bank rate that
usually meets the short- and medium-term financing needs of the private sector. Both
variables are average values for the period 2000-2019. Both datasets are from the World
Bank Database. We exclude South Sudan, Venezuela, Congo, and Argentina as outliers
because their annual average inflation rate in this period is over 40%. The upward-sloping
line is the approximation line. The coefficient is 1.10, the standard error is 0.16, and the
t-value is 6.96.
Our paper builds an analytically tractable growthmodel featuring the financing choice
of R&D firms that is consistent with the above stylized facts. The R&D firms finance their
R&D investment using only internal cash when the incentive to innovate is weak. In this
case, the scale of R&D investment may be financially constrained by internal cash because
external financing is costly. However, when the incentive is sufficiently strong, the R&D
firms additionally rely on external funds as per pecking order theory. In our model, the
inflation rate plays a crucial role in an R&D firm’s financing choice through the interest
rate. As a stylized fact, the lending interest rate is positively correlated with the inflation
rate (see Fig. 1). This relationship emerges via the Fisher equation in our model. Since
a higher inflation rate increases borrowing costs, an R&D firm that exhausts its internal
cash is likely to face an internal financial constraint. Conversely, when the inflation rate
is the lowest (i.e., the nominal interest rate is zero), an R&D firm that exhausts its internal
cash can smoothly borrow money because there is no borrowing cost.
We show that the relationship between patent protection and growth can be either
N-shaped, inverted-U shaped, or positive depending on the inflation rate. Specifically, we
find that the pro-patent policy is likely to have a negative (positive) effect on growthwhen
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the inflation rate is (low) high. To the best of our knowledge, the relationship between
the patent puzzle and inflation obtained in our paper is a new finding.
Related literature
Our paper relates to several strands of the literature. First, many existing studies have
addressed the patent puzzle (e.g., Furukawa, 2007; Iwaisako and Futagami, 2013; Suzuki,
2015, 2019; Chu, Cozzi, Fan, Pan, and Zhang, 2019 (hereafter referred to as CCFPZ (2019));
Chu, Lai, and Liao, 2019; Klein, 2020). These papers study the issue in many different
ways. However, to the best of our knowledge, CCFPZ (2019) is the only study that
addresses the patent puzzle in an endogenous growth model with financial constraints.
They emphasize that pro-patent policy has a negative (positive) effect on growth when
the financial constraint is (not) binding. As a result, their model shows an inverted-U
shaped relationship between patent protection and innovation.
Although CCFPZ (2019) overlaps with our paper, our contributions are notably dif-
ferent from theirs. First, our model analyzes the impact of the inflation rate on the
growth effect of pro-patent policy by considering a monetary authority that can control
the interest rate on loans by targeting the inflation rate, while there is no such monetary
authority in CCFPZ (2019). Therefore, our paper provides new insights into the inter-
action of monetary policy and pro-patent policy. Second, the mechanisms that generate
the nonmonotonic relationship between patent protection and innovation are different.
CCFPZ (2019) consider an “external” financial constraint whereby the amount of money
that entrepreneurs can borrow from banks is limited due to imperfect information. In
contrast, we consider an internal financial constraint; that is, the scale of R&D investment
is constrained by the R&D firm’s internal cash due to the borrowing cost. Third, we show
that the relationship between patent protection and innovation can be either N-shaped,
inverted-U shaped, or positive. Therefore, the inverted-U shaped relationship in CCFPZ
(2019) emerges as a special case in our model.
In addition, Chu, Lai, and Liao (2019) is also related to our paper because they
also investigate the interaction between patent policy and monetary policy.3 While they
analyze the impact of patent protection on the growth effect of monetary policy, we focus
on the converse direction as already explained. Therefore, our paper complements their
paper. Furthermore, the results are notably different. Although the direction of the
growth effect of patent policy is independent of monetary policy in Chu, Lai, and Liao
(2019)4, our paper finds that the growth effect of patent policy can be positive or negative
3Huang et al. (2017) also analyze the interaction of patent policy and monetary policy. They assume that
entrepreneurs must finance an exogenous fraction of their R&D investment with external debt, while we
consider an endogenous financing choice for R&D firms. Therefore, our paper complements their paper.
4See equation (25) in their study.
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depending on monetary policy.
Second, this paper relates to recent endogenous growth models with financial con-
straints. These studies consider exogenous financial constraints on external financing.5
For example, Aghion et al. (2019) assume that an innovating firm cannot invest more
than µ times the current firm value. Similarly, Aghion et al. (2010) and Aghion et al.
(2012) assume that an entrepreneur cannot borrowmore than µ times the short-run profit
flow. In contrast, we do not consider such exogenous financial constraints on external
financing. Instead, we consider the internal financial constraint explained above.
Finally, this paper also relates to recent monetary Schumpeterian growth models in
Chu andCozzi (2014), Chu et al. (2015), Chu et al. (2017), Chu, Cozzi, Fan, Furukawa, and
Liao (2019), and Zheng et al. (2019). They assume that potential firms must finance an
exogenous fraction of their R&D investment with external debt.6 Although their models
help us to understand the effect of borrowing costs on innovation, they do not consider
firms’ financing choice, which is endogenized in our model. Therefore, there is a notable
difference between their models and our model.
A stylized fact
We consider the empirical relationship among patent protection, the inflation rate, and
economic growth by using cross-country panel data on 45 countries for the period 1998-
2012.7 The patent protection data come from Papageorgiadis et al. (2014), who provide
a set of composite indices of patent system strength for developing countries and indus-
trialized countries. We use the World Bank Database for the GDP growth rate, the per
capita GDP growth rate, and the inflation rate.8
We consider a similar specification to CCFPZ (2019). We estimate
gi,t+1 = β0 + β1Patenti,t + β2Inflationi,t + β3Patenti,t · Inflationi,t
+ΓXi,t +Countryi + Yeart + ε i,t.
The dependent variable gi,t+1 is the growth rate of GDP or the growth rate of per capita
GDP in country i in year t + 1. The lagged value allows us to capture the time lag of R&D
success. Patenti,t is the strength of patent protection, and Inflationi,t is the inflation rate
in country i in year t. Patenti,t · Inflationi,t is the interaction term. Xi,t is a vector of control
5An exception is Hori (2019). In his model, the financial constraint on external financing endogenously
emerges through the borrowers’ incentive to engage in moral hazard.
6This setup seems to be inconsistent with Brown et al. (2009). They point out that young firms in the U.S.
finance R&D investment almost entirely with internal cash or external equity, not external debt.
7There are 48 countries in Papageorgiadis et al. (2014). However, we exclude Argentine and Taiwan
because their inflation rates during the period are not available in the World Bank Database. Additionally,
we drop Hong Kong because the ratio of deposit money banks’ assets to GDP is not available.
8For the inflation rate, we use “Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)” in the World Bank Database.
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GDP growth rate
GDP per capita
growth rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Patent
0.70**
(0.32)
0.57
(0.33)
0.66**
(0.32)
0.63
(0.33)
Inflation
0.05
(0.07)
0.09
(0.07)
0.08
(0.07)
0.11
(0.07)
Patent · Inflation
−0.03
(0.02)
−0.04**
(0.02)
−0.04**
(0.02)
−0.05**
(0.02)
Other controls No Yes No Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 561 561 561 561
Adjusted R2 0.58 0.59 0.55 0.56
Table 1: * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. Patent is the
level of patent protection. Inflation is the inflation rate. Other control variables include
the unemployment rate, the level of financial development, and the degree of openness.
Standard errors in parentheses.
variables that consists of the unemployment rate, the level of financial development, and
the degree of openness.9 To control for omitted country characteristics and time trends,
a country fixed effect (Countryi) and a year fixed effect (Yeart) are included. Table 2 in
Appendix A reports the summary statics of these variables.
Our model in subsequent sections predicts that the growth effect of pro-patent policy
is likely to be negative under a higher inflation rate. This implies that β3 < 0.
Table 1 shows the results. As shown in columns (2) and (4), the coefficient of the
interaction term is significantly negative even after including some control variables. In
line with our theoretical prediction, this result shows that a higher inflation rate has a
negative impact on the growth effect of pro-patent policy. Furthermore, in columns (2)
and (4), the coefficient of patent protection is positive but not significant. This seems to be
consistent with the unclear relationship between patent protection and economic growth
that we obtained in the model.
9Following CCFPZ (2019), we use the ratio of deposit money banks’ assets to GDP as the level of financial
development. The degree of openness is defined as the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP.
We use the World Bank Database for the unemployment rate and the degree of openness. For the level of
financial development, we use the financial structure dataset (September 2019 version) in theGlobal Financial
Development Report 2019/2020 of the World Bank.
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Roadmap
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a monetary Schumpeterian growth
model and solves for the long-run equilibrium. Section 3 shows the relationship between
inflation and the growth effect of pro-patent policy. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The model
Our model is based on Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch.4).10 We extend their model
by (a) introducing debt financing to raise funding for R&D investment, (b) assuming that
the duopolistic industry consists of a leader and a follower, and (c) assuming Cournot
competition instead of Bertrand competition.
2.1 Households
The economy consists of identical and infinitely lived households. The population size
in the economy is L > 0, and there is no population growth. Time is continuous. Each
household inelastically supplies one unit of labor and earns a wage in every period. A
representative household has the following intertemporal utility function:
ut =
∫ ∞
0
exp(−ρt) ln ctdt,
where ρ is the subjective discount rate and ct denotes the consumption of the final good
at time t. The budget constraint (expressed in real terms) is given by
a˙t + m˙t = rtat + τt + itbt + wt − pitmt − ct.
at is the real value of assets (equities), and rt is the real interest rate. τt is a lump-sum
transfer from the government. bt is the amount of real money lent to firms, and it is the
rate of return. wt is the real wage rate. mt is the amount of money held by this household,
and it entails the opportunity cost of the inflation rate pit ≡ P˙t/Pt, where Pt is the price
level of final goods. The representative household can lend money until it reaches mt.
Therefore, bt ≤ mt holds. We do not impose a cash-in-advance constraint on consumption
because, as Chu and Cozzi (2014) showed, it does not affect the balanced growth path
when the households inelastically supply labor.
From standard optimization, when the households hold both money and assets, the
Fisher equation holds: it = pit + rt. This is a no-arbitrage condition and shows that it is
10In their model, only potential firms that earn zero profit conduct R&D by financing the investment with
external equity. In contrast, our model assumes that existing firms that earn a positive profit invest in R&D
by financing it with internal cash and debt.
7
also the nominal interest rate.
Each household decides ct in each period to maximize the intertemporal utility func-
tion, ut, subject to the intertemporal budget constraint. From standard dynamic optimiza-
tion, the household’s optimal time path of consumption is represented by
c˙t
ct
= rt − ρ. (1)
2.2 Final good industry
The final good is produced by perfectly competitive firms that use a composite of inter-
mediate goods as inputs. The economy has a continuum of intermediate goods industries
indexed by ℓ ∈ [0, 1]. The production function is given by
X = exp

∫ 1
0
ln

k˜(ℓ)∑
k=0
qk(ℓ)y
d
k,t(ℓ)

 dℓ

 , (2)
where ydk,t(ℓ) is the input of an intermediate good with quality qk(ℓ) in industry ℓ at
time t. There are k˜(ℓ) + 1 generations of goods (k = 0, 1, ..., k˜(ℓ)) in industry ℓ. We
assume that the quality of each generation qk(ℓ) is represented as an integer k power
of λ > 1, which means that the quality of the new generation is λ times higher than
that of the previous generation. Then, qk(ℓ) = λqk−1(ℓ) holds. We assume that the
initial quality is one: q0 = 1. Then, qk = λ
k holds. By the additive specification in the
abovementioned production function, the k˜(ℓ) + 1 generations of intermediate goods are
perfect substitutes. As discussed below, intermediate goods firms produce only the latest
generation of goods. From profit maximization, the conditional demand function for the
intermediate good in industry ℓ is given by
yd
k˜
(ℓ) =
X
pk˜(ℓ)
.
2.3 Monetary authority
Following Chu and Cozzi (2014) and subsequent studies, we assume that the monetary
authority can keep the nominal interest rate it constant (it = i ≥ 0). Then, the inflation rate
is endogenously determined according to the Fisher equation such that pi = i − rt. The
growth rate of the nominal money supply is given by µt = pit + m˙t/mt. The monetary
authority returns the seigniorage revenue to households through a lump-sum transfer
τL = µtmt.
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2.4 Intermediate goods industry
Basic setup
Each intermediate goods industry is a duopolistic market in which there is a leader and a
follower that imitates the leader’s good. They engage in Cournot competition. Following
Goh and Olivier (2002), we assume that the unit cost of producing imitative goods is
increasing in patent breadth. Specifically, while the leader can produce one state-of-the-
art good by using one unit of labor, the follower must devote χ ∈ [1,λ) units of labor to
produce one unit of the same quality good, where χ is the level of patent breadth. For
example, χ = 1 implies that the follower can perfectly imitate the leader’s production
technology (no protection case).
The follower invests in R&D with the aim of developing the next generation of the
good. After the follower succeeds at innovation, it leapfrogs the leader and becomes the
new leader.
When χ < λ holds, the old leader (the current follower) chooses to imitate the new
leader’s good rather than produce its own good, which is one generation behind the new
leader’s good. This means that old generations of intermediate goods are never produced
by firms. The reason is as follows. Since each generation of goods consists of perfect
substitutes, the final goods firms purchase the intermediate good that has the lowest
price per quality. Therefore, the follower chooses to imitate the leader’s good if the unit
production cost per quality is decreased by doing so. The quality of the leader’s good
is λk˜, and the follower can produce a unit of imitation good by paying χw. Therefore,
the unit production cost per quality is χw/λk˜. On the other hand, the quality of the
previous latest good is λk˜−1. The follower (the old leader) can produce a unit of good
by paying w. Therefore, the unit production cost per quality is w/λk˜−1. If χ < λ, then
χw/λk˜ < w/λk˜−1 holds. As a result, the follower chooses to imitate the new leader’s
good rather than produce its own good, which is one generation behind the new leader’s
good.
Cournot equilibrium
From yd = X/p, the inverse demand function for intermediate goods in an industry is
p = X/yd. Given the inverse demand function and the wage rate of one unit of labor, firm
j maximizes its profit, Πj. j = L if firm j is the leader, and j = F if firm j is the follower.
The profit maximization problem of firm j is
max
yj
Πj =
X
yd
· yj − γjw · yj, (3)
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where yj is the output level and γj is the unit cost of production. Note that γL = 1 and
γF = χ.
In market equilibrium, the demand for intermediate goods equals the aggregate out-
put in the intermediate goods industry. Then, the market clearing condition is
yd = yL + yF ≡ Y, (4)
where yL is the leader’s output, yF is the follower’s output, and Y is the aggregate output
in the intermediate goods industry.
By solving (3), we obtain the output of firm j as follows:
∂Πj
∂yj
= 0 ⇔
X
yd
−
X
(yd)2
yj − γjw = 0
⇔ yj = y
d −
γjw
X
(yd)2. (5)
Using (4) and (5), we can derive the industry’s aggregate output in the Cournot
equilibrium YC as follows:
Y = yL + yF
= Y −
w
X
Y2 + Y − χ
w
X
Y2
⇔ YC =
1
1+ χ
X
w
. (6)
Then, from p = X/yd, yd = Y, and (6), the Cournot equilibrium price is pC = (1+ χ)w.
Using (4)-(6), we obtain the Cournot equilibrium output of each firm as follows:
yF =
1
(1+ χ)2
X
w
, (7)
yL =
χ
(1+ χ)2
X
w
. (8)
The follower and leader’s profits are given by
ΠF(χ) =
(
1
1+ χ
)2
X, (9)
ΠL(χ) =
(
χ
1+ χ
)2
X. (10)
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2.5 R&D and financing
The success of R&D investment follows a Poisson process. The follower succeeds at
performing R&D with probability aZ by employing Z units of workers (a > 0).
The follower can finance the cost of R&D investment, Zw, with internal cash and
external debt. 11 We assume that the follower must pay an exogenous fraction (1− ζ) ∈
[0, 1] of the profit as the dividend. In other words, (1− ζ) is the minimum dividend payout
ratio of the follower.12 Let zI be the number of researchers whose cost is financed with
internal cash. Then, the follower faces the following internal financial constraint:
zIw ≤ ζΠF. (11)
Let zD be the number of researchers whose cost is financed by borrowing money from
the households. Z = zI + zD naturally holds. The follower who borrows zDw must repay
(1+ i)zDw.
As in Aghion et al. (1997) and Aghion et al. (2001), we assume that potential firms
do not perform R&D activities.13 Recent empirical studies have found that existing firms’
own-product improvement, rather than creative destruction bymarket entrants, is amajor
source of economic growth. For example, Garcia-Macia et al. (2019) report that 80.2% of
TFP growth in the U.S. for the period 2003-2013 is attributable to innovation by existing
firms. Therefore, in the quality-improvement innovation model, it seems that existing
firms’ R&D activities should be highlighted rather than potential firms’ R&D activities.
Note that, as in Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch.4) and other subsequent studies,
because of Arrow’s replacement effect, the leader in each industry does not perform R&D.
Even if the current leader succeeds at performingR&D, their firm’s value does not increase
because the latest good is instantaneously imitated by the follower. Empirically, although
it has the ability to innovate, the leader firm tends to lack the incentive to do so (e.g.,
Igami (2017)).
2.6 The labor market
In the economy, labor is allocated to production and R&D. In labor market equilibrium,
aggregate labor demand must equal labor supply L. The condition for labor market
11To avoid complexity, we do not consider seasoned equity offerings, which are new equity issues by an
existing publicly traded firm. Instead, we focus on these two financing methods.
12The dividend payout ratio is the proportion of a firm’s profits that are paid out as a dividend to
shareholders.
13The assumption can be justified by assuming that the research productivity of existing firms is higher than
that of potential firms because manufacturing experience gives the producer essential clues about further
innovations.
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equilibrium is
yL + χyF + zI + zD = L. (12)
2.7 Bellman equations
LetVL andVF be thefirmvalue of the leader and thefirmvalue of the follower, respectively.
Consider the returns from holding the leader’s stock. The leader earns ΠL in every
period, and it is perfectly distributed to the stockholders (households). However, when
the follower succeeds at innovating, the leader’s firm value VL falls to VF. We assume that
there is a perfectly risk-free asset market and that the interest rate on safe assets is equal to
r. Therefore, the following equation holds as a no-arbitrage condition (NAC) in the asset
market.
rVL = ΠL(χ) + V˙L − a(zI + zD)(VL −VF), (13)
where V˙L is the capital gain of the stock and a(zI + zD) is the probability of the follower’s
R&D success.
Next, consider the returns from holding the follower’s stock. The follower earns ΠF in
every period. When the follower succeeds at innovating, the firm valueVF rises toVL. The
follower decides zI and zD under constraint (11). Therefore, the NAC for the follower’s
stock is as follows:
rVF − V˙F = max
zI ,zD
{ΠF(χ)− zIw + a(zI + zD)(VL −VF)− (1+ i)zDw}. (14)
Then, from (14), the follower’s optimal zI and zD are determined as follows:
• Case 0. a(VL −VF) < w
– zI = zD = 0.
• Case 1. a(VL −VF) = w:
– zI is indeterminate in [0, ζΠF/w] and zD = 0.
• Case 2. w < a(VL −VF) < (1+ i)w:
– zI = ζΠF/w and zD = 0.
• Case 3. a(VL −VF) = (1+ i)w:
– zI = ζΠF/w and zD is indeterminate in [0,∞).
• Case 4. a(VL −VF) > (1+ i)w:
12
– zI = ζΠF/w and zD → ∞.
Throughout the paper, we consider a parameter range that satisfies w ≤ a(VL − VF) ≤
(1+ i)w because case 0 is uninteresting and case 4 is inconsistent with the labor market
equilibrium. Therefore, we focus on case 1, case 2, and case 3.
2.8 The balanced growth path
We analyze the balanced growth path (BGP) where each variable grows at a constant
growth rate. In the decentralized equilibrium, all markets clear, the firm value of two
firms sums to the value of households’ assets, VL + VF = A where A = aL, and the
amount of money borrowed by the follower is equal to the amount of money lent by the
households, zDw = bL. Variables with an asterisk (∗) are the BGP values.
On the BGP, all real variables grow at g:
g ≡
c˙t
ct
=
X˙t
Xt
=
w˙t
wt
.
To calculate g, we substitute yd = YC into (2). Then, we obtain
ln Xt =
∫ 1
0
ln qt(ℓ)dℓ+ ln Xt − lnwt − ln(1+ χ).
The first term on the right-hand side can be rewritten as the product of lnλ and the
expected number of improvements in a time interval of length t. Then,
lnwt = aZt lnλ− ln(1+ χ).
By differentiating this with respect to time, we obtain the economic growth rate:
g = aZ lnλ.
From this and (1), the real interest rate on the BGP is given by
r = aZ lnλ + ρ. (15)
3 The effect of the pro-patent policy on innovation
3.1 Case 1
First, we consider the case of
a(VL −VF) = w. (16)
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By solving the equilibrium conditions, we obtain the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. The R&D intensity in case 1 is given by
z∗I =
(χ2 − 1)L− 2ρχ/a
χ2 + 2χ(1+ lnλ)− 1
. (17)
Therefore, pro-patent policy (χ ↑) enhances innovation in case 1.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Intuitively, pro-patent policy widens the gap between ΠL and ΠF from (9) and (10).
Then, the follower has a strong incentive to be the new leader (the Schumpeterian effect).
However, when χ becomes sufficiently high, z∗I may reach the upper bound ζΠF/w. Then,
the economy shifts from case 1 to case 2.
3.2 Case 2
Second, we consider the case of w < a(VL − VF) < (1+ i)w. In this case, the internal
financial constraint is binding:
zI =
ζΠF
w
. (18)
By solving the equilibrium conditions, we obtain the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. The R&D intensity in case 2 is given by
z∗I =
ζL
ζ + 2χ
. (19)
Therefore, pro-patent policy (χ ↑) decreases innovation in case 2.
Proof. See Appendix C.
The intuition is very simple. In case 2, the follower spends all its profit to finance R&D
investment. In other words, the follower’s R&D investment is financially constrained by
its internal cash ΠF(χ). Since pro-patent policy widens the gap between ΠL and ΠF, the
follower potentially wants to invest more. However, because external financing is costly,
the follower does not borrow money (recall that a(VL − VF) < (1+ i)w holds). Since
pro-patent policy decreases the follower’s internal cash, it naturally stifles innovation (the
cash-shrinking effect). This effect did not emerge in case 1 because the follower did not face
the internal financial constraint.
However, when patent protection is sufficiently strong, the gap between ΠL and ΠF
becomes very large. Then, the follower may have an incentive to invest in R&D by
financing with external debt. This is case 3 and discussed in the next subsection.
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3.3 Case 3
Third, we consider the case of
a(VL −VF) = (1+ i)w. (20)
As in case 2, the follower spends all its profit to finance R&D investment. However, in
case 3, the follower starts to rely on external debt. This is the difference between case 2
and case 3.
The equilibrium conditions provide the following Lemma.
Lemma 3. In case 3, pro-patent policy (χ ↑) increases the externally financed part of R&D
investment z∗D but decreases the internally financed part of R&D investment z
∗
I . Overall, pro-
patent policy increases the total R&D intensity, Z∗.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The intuition is as follows. Pro-patent policy increases the reward from innovation (the
Schumpeterian effect), and it naturally stimulates the follower’s incentive to invest in R&D.
In contrast, as in case 2, pro-patent policy decreases the follower’s profit (the cash-shrinking
effect), and it decreases the internally financed part of R&D investment. However, unlike
case 2, the followerdoes not face the internal financial constraint because it borrowsmoney
from the household. As a result, the Schumpeterian effect dominates the cash-shrinking
effect, and therefore, pro-patent policy increases innovation.
3.4 The global relationship between patent protection and innovation
We summarize the growth effect of pro-patent policy described in the previous subsec-
tions. First, we show the parameter conditions under which each case arises. We define
χ =
ρ
aL
+
√( ρ
aL
)2
+ 1, (21)
χ1 =
ρ +
√
ρ2 + aL[ζρ + (1+ ζ(1+ lnλ))aL]
aL
, (22)
and
χ2 =
ρ(1+ i) +
√
(ρ(1+ i))2 + aLΨ
aL
(23)
where Ψ = ζρ(1+ i) + [1+ ζ(1+ 2i + (1+ i) lnλ)]aL. We can easily show that 1 < χ <
χ1 ≤ χ2 holds.
From the analyses in the previous subsections, we obtain the following result.
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Figure 2: The effect of pro-patent policy and innovation when the inflation rate is positive (i > 0
and χ2 < λ).
Lemma 4. Suppose that i > 0 holds. Then, case 1 arises when χ ∈ [χ,χ1], case 2 arises when
χ ∈ (χ1,χ2), and case 3 arises when χ ∈ [χ2,λ).
Proof. See Appendix E.
Then, we can show the global relationship between patent protection and innovation.
FromLemma 4 and the discussion in previous subsections, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 1. Pro-patent policy (χ ↑) increases innovation in χ ∈ [χ,χ1] (case 1) but decreases
innovation in χ ∈ (χ1,χ2) (case 2). However, pro-patent policy increases innovation again in
χ ∈ [χ2,λ) (case 3).
Proposition 1 implies that the global relationship between patent protection and in-
novation depends on the existence of cases 2 and 3. Suppose that i > 0 holds. When
χ2 < λ, the relationship between patent protection and innovation is N-shaped, as shown
in Fig. 2. As can easily be predicted, when λ < χ2, their relationship becomes inverted-U
shaped, as shown in Fig. 3. In addition, when λ < χ1, their relationship becomes positive,
as shown in Fig. 4.
Our results suggest that pro-patent policy enhances innovation when the internal
financial constraint is not binding but hinders innovation when it is binding. In the next
subsection, we interpret this result by highlighting the role of the inflation rate.
3.5 The inflation rate and policy effects
We discuss the relationship between the inflation rate and the growth effect of pro-patent
policy. In our model, the inflation rate pi influences the growth effect of pro-patent policy
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Figure 3: The effect of pro-patent policy and innovation when the inflation rate is extremely high
(i > 0 and λ < χ2).
through the nominal interest rate i = pi + r. In cases 1 and 2, the results are independent
of the nominal interest rate because the follower does not finance R&D with external
debt. Conversely, the nominal interest rate affects the results in case 3, where the follower
borrows money.
Suppose that the monetary authority increases the inflation rate in case 3. Then, we
obtain the following result.
Proposition 2. A higher inflation rate decreases innovation in case 3. Therefore, a zero nominal
interest rate (Friedman rule) is optimal from the perspective of growth.
Proof. See Appendix F.
Proposition 2 implies that a higher nominal interest rate is harmful for growth. The
logic is quite simple. In our model, the nominal interest rate makes innovation costly for
the follower in case 3. Therefore, the zero nominal interest rate is always optimal from the
perspective of growth. To keep the nominal interest rate at zero, the monetary authority
must set the inflation rate at a negative value, pi = −r.
Furthermore, for the effect of the inflation rate on the optimal patent policy, we obtain
the following result, which is consistent with the stylized fact in the introduction.
Proposition 3. A higher (lower) inflation rate expands (narrows) the parameter region of case
2. Then, pro-patent policy is likely to have a negative (positive) effect on innovation. In contrast,
under a zero nominal interest rate (Friedman rule), pro-patent policy always has a positive effect
on innovation.
Proof. From (23), χ2 is increasing in the inflation rate. When the inflation rate is sufficiently
high, χ2 exceeds λ, and therefore, case 3 vanishes (see Fig. 3). When i = 0, we obtain
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Figure 4: The effect of pro-patent policy and innovation under the Friedman rule (i = 0).
χ1 = χ2. Therefore, case 2 vanishes (see Fig. 4).
Proposition 3 suggests that the optimal patent policy depends on the inflation rate
and the current level of patent protection. If the inflation rate and the level of patent
protection are sufficiently high, firms may face an internal financial constraint (e.g., case
2 in Fig. 3). In this case, the government should weaken patent protection to increase
firms’ internal cash. In contrast, if the inflation rate is sufficiently low, the possibility that
case 2 arises is low. Specifically, under the Friedman rule, a follower that has exhausted
its internal cash can smoothly rely on external debt because there is no case 2 (see Fig. 4).
In this case, the government should strengthen patent protection.
4 Conclusion
Our paper analyzed the growth effect of pro-patent policy in a monetary Schumpeterian
growth model with an internal financial constraint.
In our model, the follower invests in R&D in an effort to leapfrog the leader by
financing R&D with internal cash (i.e., Cournot profit) and external debt. The follower
endogenously chooses how to finance the R&D investment, and its financing choice
depends on the patent protection level. Because debt financing entails a borrowing cost,
when patent protection is weak, the follower uses only internal cash to finance R&D
investment. If the borrowing cost is high, a follower that has exhausted its internal
cash cannot borrow money. In this case, the follower faces a binding internal financial
constraint; that is, the follower cannot invest more in R&D than its internal cash. In
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contrast, when patent protection is strong, the follower starts to rely on external debt in
addition to internal cash because the incentive to innovate is very strong.
We have identified two opposite effects of pro-patent policy on innovation-driven
growth. The first is a positive effect of pro-patent policy on innovation, which comes
from the fact that stronger patent protection increases the reward for innovation (the
Schumpeterian effect). The second is a negative effect of pro-patent policy on innovation
through the internal cash constraint. Stronger patent protection prevents the follower
from improving its production technology by imitating the leader’s technology. Then,
pro-patent policy hinders innovation because it shrinks the follower’s profit, which is the
follower’s only financing source (the cash-shrinking effect).
Our main results are summarized as follows. When patent protection is weak, pro-
patent policy enhances innovation because the follower’s investment is not financially
constrained. In this case, there is only the Schumpeterian effect and no cash-shrinking
effect. In contrast, when patent protection is moderate, pro-patent policy stifles innova-
tion because the follower’s investment is financially constrained. However, when patent
protection is strong, pro-patent policy enhances innovation again because the follower
finances R&D investment with external debt, and therefore, R&D is not financially con-
strained. As a result, there is an N-shaped relationship between patent protection and
innovation under certain parameter conditions. Furthermore, we find that a zero nominal
interest rate not only enhances innovation but also makes the growth effect of pro-patent
policy always positive.
Appendix
A. The descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
gi,t+1(GDP) 561 3.18 3.44 -14.76 14.53
gi,t+1 (GDP per capita) 561 2.32 3.35 -14.38 13.64
Patenti,t 561 6.44 2.10 2.50 9.90
Inflationi,t 561 4.67 7.99 -4.48 85.75
Unemploymenti,t 561 7.81 4.92 0.62 33.47
FinDevi,t 561 95.35 7.48 53.69 100.00
Openi,t 561 85.47 59.29 16.44 437.33
Table 2: The descriptive statistics. gi,t+1 is the economic growth rate measured by the
growth rate of GDP or the growth rate of GDP per capita. Patenti,t is the index of patent
protection. Inflationi,t is the inflation rate. Unemploymenti,t is the unemployment rate.
FinDevi,t is the ratio of deposit money banks’ assets to GDP.Openi,t is the sum of exports
and imports as a share of GDP.
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B. The proof of Lemma 1
From (14), (16), and zD = 0, we obtain the follower’s firm value as follows:
VF =
ΠF(χ)
r
. (24)
Then, from (13), (24), and zD = 0, the leader’s firm value is given by
VL =
ΠL(χ) + (azI/ρ) ·ΠF(χ)
r + azI
. (25)
Then, using (15), (16), and (25), we obtain an important equation as follows:
w
X
=
a
ρ + azI(1+ lnλ)
χ2 − 1
(1+ χ)2
. (26)
In addition, from (7), (8), and (12), we obtain another important equation.
w
X
=
2χ
(1+ χ)2
1
L− zI
. (27)
By solving (26) and (27), we obtain (17).
To complete the proof, we show that z∗I is increasing in χ. Differentiating (17) with
respect to χ yields
dz∗I
dχ
=
(χ2 + 2χ(1+ lnλ)− 1)(2χL− 2ρ/a)− (2χ + 2(1+ lnλ))[(χ2 − 1)L− 2ρχ/a]
(χ2 + 2χ(1+ lnλ)− 1)2
=
2(χ2 + 1)(L(1+ lnλ) + ρ/a)
(χ2 + 2χ(1+ lnλ)− 1)2
> 0.
C. The proof of Lemma 2
From (9) and (18), we obtain
w
X
=
ζ
(1+ χ)2zI
. (28)
From (7), (8), and (12), we obtain (27) again. Using (27) and (28), we can solve for z∗I as in
(19). Furthermore, (19) is decreasing in χ.
D. The proof of Lemma 3
For convenience, we first prove the second sentence in Lemma 3. By using (14), (18), and
(20), we obtain the follower’s firm value as follows:
VF =
(1+ ζi)ΠF(χ)
ρ + aZ lnλ
. (29)
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Figure 5: The equilibrium in case 3.
By using (13), (18), and (20), we obtain the leader’s firm value as follows:
VL =
ΠL(χ) + aZVF
ρ + aZ(1+ lnλ)
. (30)
Then, from (9), (10), (20), (29), and (30), we obtain an important equation:
w =
a
1+ i
(VL −VF)
⇔ w =
a
1+ i
ΠL − (1+ ζi)ΠF
ρ + aZ(1+ lnλ)
⇔
w
X
=
a
1+ i
(
1
1+ χ
)2 χ2 − (1+ ζi)
ρ + aZ(1+ lnλ)
. (31)
Furthermore, from (7), (8), and (12), we obtain another important equation as follows:
w
X
=
2χ
(1+ χ)2(L− Z)
. (32)
(31) is a decreasing function of Z, and (32) is an increasing function of Z. In 5, Z∗ is
determined by the intersection of (31) and (32), and it is given by
Z∗ =
(χ2 − (1+ ζi))L− (1+ i)2χρ/a
(χ2 − (1+ ζi)) + (1+ i)2χ(1+ lnλ)
.
From (9) and (10), pro-patent policy shifts the downward-sloping curve (31) upward.
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We define
f (χ) ≡
2χ
(1+ χ)2
.
By differentiating this with respect to χ, we obtain
f ′(χ) =
2(1− χ)
(1+ χ)3
< 0.
Therefore, pro-patent policy shifts the upward-sloping curve (32) downward. As a result,
pro-patent policy raises Z∗.
Next, we prove the first part of Lemma 3. From (13) and (20), VL can also be written as
VL =
ΠL(χ)− Z(1+ i)w
ρ + aZ lnλ
.
Substituting this, (18), and (29) into (20) yields
w =
ΠL(χ)− [ζ(1+ i)(1+ lnλ) + 1+ ζi]ΠF(χ)
(1+ i)(ρ/a + (1+ lnλ)zD)
⇔
w
X
=
1
(1+ χ)2
χ2 − [ζ(1+ i)(1+ lnλ) + 1+ ζi]
(1+ i)(ρ/a + (1+ lnλ)zD)
. (33)
In addition, using (9), (18), and (32), we obtain
w
X
=
2χ + ζ
(1+ χ)2(L− zD)
. (34)
The intersection of (33) and (34) gives z∗D. Pro-patent policy shifts the downward-sloping
curve (33) upward. We define
g(χ) ≡
2χ + ζ
(1+ χ)2
.
Differentiating this with respect to χ yields
g′(χ) =
2(1− χ− ζ)
(1+ χ)3
< 0.
Therefore, pro-patent policy shifts the upward-sloping curve (34) downward. As a result,
pro-patent policy increases z∗D. In addition, from (9), (18) and (32), we obtain
z∗I =
ζ(L− z∗D)
2χ + ζ
.
As already shown, pro-patent policy increases z∗D. Therefore, pro-patent policy decreases
z∗I .
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E. The proof of Lemma 4
First, we derive the lower bound of χ in case 1 (z∗I ∈ [0, ζΠF/w]). From (17), z
∗
I is zero
when (χ2 − 1)L− 2ρχ/a = 0. By solving this, we obtain
χ =
( ρ
aL
)
+
√( ρ
aL
)2
+ 1.
Second, we derive the upper bound of χ in case 1. On the boundary of case 1 and case
2, z∗I is equal to ζΠF/w. From (9), (17), and (27),
ζ
ΠF
w
= ζ
X
(1+ χ)2w
= ζ
L− zI
2χ
= ζ
L(1+ lnλ) + ρ/a
χ2 + 2χ(1+ lnλ)− 1
.
Then, substituting this into (18) yields
z∗I =
ζΠF
w
⇔ (χ2 − 1)L− 2ρχ/a = ζ[L(1+ lnλ) + ρ/a]
⇔ aLχ2 − 2ρχ− [ζρ + (1+ ζ(1+ lnλ))aL] = 0.
By solving this, we obtain the threshold between case 1 and case 2 as follows:
χ1 =
ρ +
√
ρ2 + aL[ζρ + (1+ ζ(1+ lnλ))aL]
aL
,
Finally, we derive the upper bound of χ in case 2. From (13) and (14), we obtain
rVL = ΠL − az
∗
I (VL −VF),
and
rVF = (1− ζ)ΠF + az
∗
I (VL −VF).
Then, using (19),
a(VL −VF) =
a[ΠL − (1− ζ)ΠF]
ρ + a(lnλ + 2)ζL/(ζ + 2χ)
.
On the boundary of case 2 and case 3, a(VL −VF) is equal to (1+ i)w. Therefore,
a[(χ/(1+ χ))2 − (1− ζ)(1/(1+ χ))2]
ρ + a(lnλ + 2)ζL/(ζ + 2χ)
= (1+ i)
w
X
= (1+ i)
ζ + 2χ
(1+ χ)2L
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⇔ a[χ2 − (1− ζ)] = [ρ + a(lnλ + 2)
ζL
ζ + 2χ
](1+ i)
ζ + 2χ
L
⇔ aLχ2 − 2ρ(1+ i)χ−Ψ = 0.
where Ψ = ζρ(1+ i) + [1+ ζ(1+ 2i + (1+ i) lnλ)]aL. Then, the threshold between cases
2 and 3 is given by
χ2 =
ρ(1+ i) +
√
(ρ(1+ i))2 + aLΨ
aL
.
F. The proof of Lemma 4
Z∗ is determined by the intersection of (31) and (32). Since the curve of (31) shifts
downward, Z∗ falls.
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